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and the Cost of Capital 
David M. Meerschwam 
This paper considers the role of “corporate finance” in contributing to Japan’s 
economic performance.  I highlight the role of the financial system while the 
“cost  of  capital”  (typically expressed  as a weighted average cost of capital 
[WACC]) is played down. The main reason for this is that, at least during the 
high  growth  phase of  the Japanese  economy  (1945-74),  a rationed capital 
allocation  system was  used  in Japan in  which the price mechanism played 
only a subordinated role. Not surprisingly, in such an environment models of 
capital budgeting do not conform to those that would obtain in a price-driven 
market.  And  while  this  does not  mean  that  standard  models  such  as  dis- 
counted  cash  flow (DCF) analysis  are obsolete,  the appropriate inputs to a 
DCF model would be more difficult to ascertain. 
With  a focus on the  institutional  organization  this paper  shows how  the 
Japanese financial system may have dealt effectively with problems currently 
associated  in  the  finance  literature  with  agency  problems  and  information 
asymmetries.  In this sense the institutional structure in which “corporate fi- 
nance” took place may have given Japanese firms (with access to funds in the 
rationed system) a competitive advantage relative to their foreign competitors 
operating in institutional environments less well organized to deal with these 
issues. 
In this paper I also show how, partly as a result of its own success and partly 
due to external forces, the distinctiveness of the institutional system would be 
eroded-in  Japan the price system would start to play a more important role. 
In this sense, the emerging Japanese financial system allows for a much more 
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meaningful comparison between the cost of  capital of  Japanese and foreign 
firms, even though this is happening precisely at a time when, due to an in- 
crease in capital mobility, it is more difficult to explain how the underlying 
interest rates for corporations in the various countries would differ. 
Still, several corporate executives and business publications have taken the 
role of  corporate finance in Japan to be a, if not the, major factor in under- 
standing the “competitive decline” of  the United States and the ascendancy of 
Japan. For example, in March 1989, Ken Olsen, president of  Digital Equip- 
ment Corporation, told the New England Council of the American Electronics 
Association that, in contrast to small increases in the cost of energy or in 
taxes, the cost of  capital was a major culprit in  causing U.S.  firms to lose 
international competitiveness: “With a 10, 11, 12, percent interest on capital, 
you just  can’t compete.”’ Olsen was not alone in attributing many of  U.S. 
corporations’ problems in competing for international market share to the cost 
of  capital, nor did he point to a new phenomenon. A 1985 Harvard Business 
Review article had been titled “Capital Markets and Competitive Decline” (see 
Richard Ellsworth  1985), while a  study by  the Chase Manhattan  Bank in 
1980, had  warned that for the semiconductor industry: “The lower cost of 
capital of the Japanese companies provides them with the advantage that their 
required  return  on  investments  are  lower  than  those  of  the  U.S.  semi- 
conductor companies” (Chase Manhattan Bank 1980, pp.  1-10;  quoted in 
Abegglen and Stalk 1985). 
It seems that finance has become a favorite “whipping boy,” to explain Ja- 
pan’s impressive performance (especially in  comparison to the remarkable 
loss of international assets observed in the United States). Apart from obvious 
misconceptions (such as Olsen’s apparent confusion between nominal, and 
inflation and  exchange rate adjusted interest rates),  it  is surprising that  so 
many executives in U.S.  industry take capital market effects to be so impor- 
tant. While there is little doubt that finance and the cost of capital play a role, 
it is not obvious how important these costs are in comparison to, for example, 
labor productivity, SGA expense control, and product quality. Perhaps it is 
easier to blame faceless capital markets for competitive decline than other 
issues more directly under the control of managers. 
Still, there is little-doubt that finance has played an important role in Japan’s 
transformation from a war-exhausted, resource-poor country to an interna- 
tional economic superpower. Those who focus on finance in this transforma- 
tion often paint a breathtakingly simple picture of the Japanese financial sys- 
tem: the authorities, after isolating the domestic financial markets from the 
international capital markets, kept interest rates low and allowed financial in- 
termediaries to steer funds to preferred sectors of  the economy so that the 
corporations,  unimpaired  by  bothersome  shareholders  with  short  term- 
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horizons, were free to enter into long-term strategies to gain market share. AS 
in most appealingly simplistic explanations, this is nothing but a curicuwe- 
it contains some truths, but surely does not capture the complexity and trade- 
offs that underlay the Japanese financial environment. 
To evaluate the importance of “finance” in contributing to Japan’s success, 
especially in cross-national comparison,  one should consider the role of  the 
financial system, the method of  capital budgeting, and the “cost of capital.” 
Of  course, apart from these “firm-specific” issues, the overall availability of 
financial resources (irrespective of the distribution  mechanism) plays a role. 
With  a  surplus of  national  savings,  the national  income identity  dictates  a 
current account surplus, which can be translated to the firm level as showing 
“competitive” advantage in order to generate a trade surplus.* Given a certain 
amount of national savings, the institutional arrangements in the financial sys- 
tem provide a link between the micro- and macrolevels. 
Many authors have pointed out that in cross-national perspective the Japa- 
nese savings rate was high, and papers such as Feldstein and Horioka (1980), 
and a veritable cottage industry of  related  investigations, have explored the 
link between national  savings rates and national investment.  For Japan both 
were high  in comparison  to the  United  States (See table 7.1).  Given these 
macrophenomena it is usually the cost of capital that provides the link to the 
micro (firm) level, which leads to a natural focus on the interest rates. 
1 argue though, that at least for the high growth phase of the Japanese econ- 
omy (1954-74),  the very  structure of the Japanese financial system makes 
measures of the (weighted average) cost of capital not very useful as indicators 
of  the relative abundance of financial capital to industries or as the determi- 
nants of  industry structure and “international  competitiveness.” What really 
mattered was that a financial system was created that allowed for guided cap- 
ital rationing.  While some may call this a form of  “national capital budget- 
ing,” perhaps in line with the popular notion of a “Japan Inc.,” this would be 
an oversimplification:  it is increasingly understood today, not only in finance 
but also in other aspects of industrial policy, that a subtle set of  dependencies, 
power relationships, and informal understandings was in operation rather than 
a system reliant on simple directives. 
In this paper, I concentrate, therefore, first on the development of the finan- 
cial system that operated in Japan until the mid-1970s. Focusing on institu- 
tional considerations, the preference for bank financing (and high leverage) is 
explained, while the role of the rationed capital market is explored. Next, the 
impetus for change is presented as a sudden and dramatic reversal in the flow 
of funds in the domestic economy toward the government. I conclude with a 
few remarks about the current cost of capital debate, as the Japanese financial 
system is moving toward a more price-driven capital market. This last issue- 
2. For simplicity, the service account is ignored here or  at  least assumed to be less than totally 
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Table 7.1  U.S.  and  Japanese National Savings 
United States  Japan 
All as % of GDP 
Net Savings  Net Savings 
as % of Net  Net  Net  Current  as % of Net  Net  Net  Current 
Investments  Savings  Investment  Account  Investments  Savings  Investment  Account 
All as % of  GDP 
1960  114.6  9.18  8.00  .62  101.4  22.12  21.81  .60 
1965  110.2  11.34  10.29  I .07  97.4  18.17  18.65  1.11 
1970  106.9  7.84  7.33  .39  104.4  26.89  25.75  1.01 
1975  125.4  5.96  4.75  1.36  97.5  19.45  19.95  -.I0 
1980  105.5  5.93  5.67  .44  99.2  18.32  19.45  -.03 
1981  102.8  6.43  6.26  .31  99.4  17.88  17.98  .49 
1982  98.9  2.68  2.71  -.03  102.1  17.03  16.68  .70 
1983  65.8  2.22  3.37  -1.00  109.7  16.07  14.64  1.81 
1984  62.9  4.38  6.97  -2.44  116.5  17.05  14.63  2.84 
1985  53.1  3.15  4.95  -2.93  120.7  17.96  14.88  3.69 
1986  42.7  2.47  5.79  -3.44  126.4  18.46  14.60  4.33 
Source: OECD National Accounts, 1988, Paris, pp. 32-35. 
Nore: Net savings  = gross savings minus consumption of  fixed capital; net investment = gross capital 
formation minus consumption of fixed capital. Due to “statistical discrepancies,” net savings minus net 
investment may deviate from current account. 
the financial  product’s  price  and the interest  rate question-is  taken  up in 
great detail by Frankel (in this volume). 
7.1  The Baditional Financial System 
Japan’s traditional financial system, here taken as the system that prevailed 
between  1945 and  1975, has, like so many other aspects of modem Japan, 
roots that go back to the Meiji Restoration of  1868. Many descriptions can be 
found, such  as  Presnell  (1975), Bronte  (1982),  Prindl  (1981),  Crum and 
Meerschwam (1986) and Wallich and Wallich (1976). They all confirm some 
basic characteristics of the system. When a rudimentary banking system was 
set up and the Bank of  Japan attained a monopoly on the issuance of notes in 
1882, Minister of Finance Count Matsukata argued for the establishment of 
specialized financial institutions. These institutions were to play an important 
role in attaining the objectives of Japan’s new rulers: “a strong army and rich 
country.” With the government actively  supporting the financial institutions 
and direct involvement in targeted  industrialization  efforts,  a second set of 
financial  institutions would  rise to prominence whose  power derived  from 
their central place in industrial groupings (zaibatsu). 
In this sense three characteristics of the system were put in place early on: 
close relationships between the authorities and the financial institutions, seg- 195  The Japanese Financial System and the Cost of Capital 
mented  financial  product markets,  and powerful banks at the center of net- 
works of corporations. These three attributes of the system operated not al- 
ways according to plan, but in essence provided the foundation for a financial 
system that would come to full bloom in the postwar years. 
When the war ended, Japan’s financial system was one part of the country’s 
institutional framework that the Occupation powers reviewed. It was decided 
to remove the specialized financial institutions, to dissolve the powerful banks 
at the centers of the old business groups, and to stimulate a more active equity 
market as large corporations  were sold to the public.  Furthermore, in con- 
formity with the U.S. financial system, Occupation planners imposed further 
segmentation between the commercial and the investment banking business. 
The transformation of the system lasted only as long as the Occupation was 
in force. Soon after it ended, Japan’s financial system started to resemble the 
old one again; specialized financial institutions, a heavy preference for indi- 
rect (i.e., bank intermediated) versus direct (i.e., corporate bonds and equity) 
financing, steering and guidance by central authorities, and suppression of the 
price mechanism in financial transactions. Central to all this was the develop- 
ment of a wide, deep, and sophisticated network of informally directed rela- 
tionships, to which I return below. This system would operate for almost three 
decades. 
In Japan, financial  institutions  faced  an environment  that  segmented the 
product market according to maturity and purpose of finance.  For example, 
long-term credit banks were the only institutions allowed to raise long-term 
funds and did not engage much in maturity transformation.  City banks, the 
successors to the old banks that had stood at the center of the industrial group- 
ings, again started to play a role as both repositories of deposits and active 
suppliers of bank finance to the rapidly growing industrial corporations. Spe- 
cialized institutions dealt  with foreign-exchange-related  transactions,  others 
with  agricultural enterprises  or fisheries, and yet others with forestry.  Trust 
banks and various forms of mutual  institutions looked after their dedicated 
markets, while regional banks functioned in particular geographic areas, often 
as gatherers of funds for the cash-hungry city banks, which in turn lent to the 
industrial sector.  Special financial institutions for small business were in ex- 
istence,  while yet a whole other set of institutions operated in the securities 
industry (see table 7.2). Of course, segmentation by product market was also 
seen in other countries such as the United States. However, a comparison of 
the two systems in Crum and Meerschwam (1986) shows Japan’s system more 
tightly controlled than that in the United States. 
The highly segmented Japanese system operated under price controls. Both 
cooperative  agreements in  setting  lending  rates  as well  as official policies 
through a “temporary interest rate adjustment law” (instituted in 1947 but still 
partially in effect today) were observed, while several institutions, such as the 
Postal  Savings System and  other (semi-)official  intermediaries  allowed  the 196  David M. Meerschwam 
Table 7.2  Selected Japanese Financial Institutions (1988) 
1.  The Bank of Japan 




Long-term credit banks 
3.  Foreign banks 
4.  Financial institutions for small businesses 
Mutual loan companies 
Credit cooperatives 
Urban credit associations 
Commercial and industrial cooperatives 
Labor credit associations 
5. Financial institutions for agriculture, forestry, and fisheries 
Cooperative bank for agriculture and forestry 
Prefectural agricultural associations 
Fishery cooperative associations 
Fishery credit cooperatives 
6.  Securities finance institutions 
Securities finance companies 
Securities companies 
7. Insurance companies 
8. Government financial institutions 
Peoples Finance Corporation 
Housing Loan Corporation 
Export-Import Bank 
Japan Development Bank 
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries Finance Corporation 
Small Business Finance Corporation 
Hokkaido and Tohoku Development Corporation 
Environmental Sanitation Business Finance Corporation 
Trust Fund Bureau 
Postal Savings System 
Postal Life Insurance 
9.  Government 
Source; Economic Statistics Annual,  1988, Research and Statistics Department, Bank of  Japan, 
pp. 1-6. 
government to influence the prices of funds in the e~onomy.~  But the system 
cannot be fully appreciated without considering the informal, unwritten, tra- 
ditions and customs that were an essential feature and caused dependencies, 
trade-offs, and negotiations. 
Several examples point to these dependencies. Take the “over-loan’’ prob- 
3. In spite of  the many price regulations some price freedoms did exist. For example, a call 
(interbank)  market was observed. Similarly, many observers point to the system of “compensating 197  The Japanese Financial System and the Cost of Capital 
lem  (see,  e.g.,  Wallich  and  Wallich  1976, pp.  284-90).  During  the  high 
growth phase of  the Japanese economy, the authorities decided to keep the 
regulated interest rates low, apparently in order to stimulate investments (but, 
in reality, to create a rationed capital market). And while banks were not able 
to aggressively compete for funds, due to the interest rate restrictions, savings 
seemed to have remained high, partly due to the elaborate Postal Savings Sys- 
tem and partly due to cultural and historical norms.4 With low, regulated rates, 
banks were faced with many more lending opportunities than they could sat- 
isfy, even after allowing for the funds gathered through the interbank market 
from the regional banks. It was the Bank of Japan that supplied the city banks 
with funds to make up for their overlending at rates that did not reflect “market 
conditions.” And  while the absolute amount of  these loans was never very 
large, the banks’ dependence on the central bank for marginal funding made 
them much  more receptive to following the wishes of  the authorities (see 
table 7.3). 
These wishes were expressed during frequent reviews of bank balance sheet 
growth and composition. But there were further avenues to enforce the com- 
munications and dependencies. A system of “parachuting” executives from a 
higher organization in the financial hierarchy to a lower one was standard. 
Thus, bureaucrats from the most prestigious Ministry of Finance and Bank of 
Japan often ended their careers as executives at the financial institutions. The 
institutions themselves often “parachuted” their (older) executives to related 
corporations and subsidiaries. 
Dependencies were also seen in other financial interactions. The funding of 
the public sector, a relatively unimportant demand on the total funds generated 
(initially due to the Occupation-imposed Dodge-line of balanced budgets), 
was not the outcome of a price-competitive auction. Instead, a well-instituted 
system of “forced” absorption of the issues by financial firms existed at prices 
set by  the authorities (see, e.g., Feldman 1986, p. 51). Such a system is not 
totally unique. In the United Kingdom, the discount houses were, in effect, 
“forced to cover the tender” after price consultation with the Bank of England 
(Revel1 1973, pp. 223-27).  In Japan, without an active secondary market, the 
financial institutions typically held on to issues for one year, after which the 
Bank of Japan mostly monetized them, clearing the balance sheets of the in- 
stitutions for the next round of the forced tender. 
Even in the market for direct finance (corporate bonds and equities), meth- 
ods were devised to enhance relationships. Some observers suggest that the 
method of  equity issue itself enhanced relationships by  favoring long-term 
balances” (observed in many other countries as well), which allowed effective rates to differ from 
the officially quoted ones. See Bronte (1982, p. 17). Still, there is widespread agreement that in 
effect few pjce freedoms existed and that a highly regulated system operated. 
4. Many authors have tried  to explain the apparently high Japanese savings rate.  See, e.g., 
Hayashi (1986) and Frankel (in this volume). 198  David M. Meerschwam 
Table 7.3  Overloans and the City Banks: City Bank Data (in Mllions of Yen) 
Total  Loans from  Call  Total 
Deposits  Bank of Japan  Money  Liabilities 
1955  2.4  .03  .07  2.9 
I960  5.6  .4  .2  6.9 
1965  12.5  1.1  .9  16.3 
1970  24.3  2.1  2.0  32.6 
1975  52.9  1.5  2.4  71.7 
1980  85.4  1.8  4.5  110.4 
1985  125.6  3.5  6.8  191.4 
Source: Economic Statistics Annual, various issues, Research and Statistics Department, Bank 
of Japan. 
shareholders. In Japan, until the early 1970s, new equity issues were made at 
par rather than at the much higher market prices of the equity. Existing share- 
holders typically had “rights” to purchase the new shares at the par rate. This, 
according to some, favored long-term relationships, supposedly since share- 
holders held on to their shares in expectation of future rights issues, again 
priced below the market rate. In this interpretation equity financing was “ex- 
pensive to the corporation ,” since the issues were sold “cheap.” 
However, this is incorrect. Rights issues are not expensive “to the corpora- 
tion,” and a “good deal to the shareholders” since the two are interchangeable. 
Because a par issue with rights to existing shareholders can take place at any 
price this is most easily seen if  one considers the par issue at a par price of 
zero. In this case a stock split takes place, and for other than signaling reasons 
associated with a possible dividend increase, no shareholder wealth effect is 
observed. 
With respect to this issue, Wallich and Wallich (1976), while still arguing 
that rights issues are “expensive to the corporation” and will inspire long-term 
shareholders, suggest a “juxtaposition” which, they argue, allows for the re- 
lationships in equity financing through the long-term shareholders: 
to believe that the shareholder is enriched by  rights, stock dividends, and 
splits, a different interpretation is required-one  in which the corporation 
is an entity with a life of its own and the stockholder is a kind of subordi- 
nated creditor. This interpretation is not irrational so long as it places the 
corporation and the old stockholders in juxtaposition with the new  stock- 
holders from whom the funds are obtained. To view old stockholders in that 
way raises the fundamental question of what, if anything, the corporation 
maximizes and on whose behalf. (p. 301) 
5. In fact, finance models that rely on information  asymmetries between managers and investors 
actually show how the effective increase in the dividends may be viewed as a positive signal about 
the future cash flows of the firm, therefore increasing  the market valuation of the firm. See Asquith 
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The above rationale for the relationships in the equity market relies, there- 
fore, on the failure of full identification  of  the shareholder and the corpora- 
tion.  Aoki  (1984), as outlined  below  in  the  context  of Japanese  leverage, 
shows how, in a model with special shareholder groups, such as banks,  it is 
indeed not possible to apply the simple shareholder-wealthkhare-price max- 
imization paradigm. However, even without having to rely on the ‘‘long-term’’ 
holdings of the individual retail investor, a simpler way to find indications of 
relationships in equity finance is to look at the importance of the crossequity 
holdings between  major corporations.  Bank of Japan data suggest that such 
equity holdings (excluding financial institutions) increased between 1966 and 
1974 from 18.6% to 27.1% (after which period the share stabilized). These 
equity holdings were traditionally extremely stable and reflected much of the 
prewar zaibatsu structure. 
The corporate bond market used another method to deal with informational 
problems  that  afflict the  securities markets.  Only fully  secured bond  issues 
were acceptable, while an inactive market placed a large portion of the rela- 
tively few issues in the hands of financial institutions (see table 7.4). It can be 
no surprise that in this system there was no role for “rating agencies.” Their 
mission  and business  purpose  is precisely  to convey  information  between 
lenders and borrowers  in the absence of a relationship between the two; in 
Japan this was of little concern. The relationships facilitated information shar- 
ing, while fully secured bonds reduced the risks even further and excluded 
potential newcomers, who lacked assets. The absence of a commercial paper 
market,  or a CD market  (where transactions occur purely on a price-driven 
basis) fits naturally within the system that relied so heavily on relationships. 
In short, in Japan during the high growth phase of the economy, a financial 
system  operated  that segmented  the  financial  product  market  and  that  re- 
stricted price competition both through regulation as well as through the lack 
of  financing  alternatives.  With  the  markets  for public  securities  restricted 
through traditions, a high growth rate naturally drove the corporations to the 
banks, for both long-term (long-term credit banks) and short-term (city banks) 
financing (see table 7.5). There, access to funds was facilitated through long- 
established  relationships.  The many restrictions that were used to close the 
domestic market from foreign influences are well known and will not be pre- 
sented here-they  closed any escape route for those companies outside the 
relationship system. In combination, all of this gave the authorities influence 
to steer the system through a rationed capital market that favored established 
corporations to rely more heavily on “cheap” indirect debt financing and thus 
high leverage. 
7.2  Direct versus Indirect Finance 
The Japanese financial system favored indirect (bank) financing over direct 
(securities) financing. This would therefore not only lead to high leverage, but Table 7.4  Industrial Bonds and the Banking Sector: Bond and Bank Asset Data (100 Million Yen) 
Industrial 
AfB  Industrial  Total  D as  D as  D as 
Bonds  Bonds  Bonds  at Banks  Assets  of  E  of c  of  A 
Nonconvertible  Convertible  Industrial  Bonds  Bank  %  %  % 


























































































Source: Economic Statistics Annual,  1988, Research and Statistics Department, Bank of  Japan, pp. 44-45,  203-4. 
Note:  The Bank of  Japan does not supply exactly matching figures and several rows rely on the author's calculations. 
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Table 7.5  Financing of Nonfinancial Corporation: Direct and Indirect 
Financing 
Direct  Indirect  External  Indirect  Internal 
Financing  Financing  Financing  Financing  Financing 
as % of  as % of  as % of  as % of  as % of 
Total  Total  Total  External  Total 
1961-64  14.0  44.6  58.6  16.1  32.1 
197G74  6.1  47.1  53.2  88.5  32.9 
1975-79  8.2  37.9  46.1  82.2  46.3 
19%-82  6.5  38.0  44.5  85.4  45.6 
1965-69  7.2  43.7  50.9  85.9  38.0 
1982-85  7.9  36.8  44.7  82.3  48.5 
Source; Tamura (1987), p. 3 
Note:  Direct  financing  = equity  and bond  issues;  indirect financing  = long- and  short-term 
borrowing; external financing = direct + indirect financing; internal financing = retained earn- 
ings + depreciation. 
to a heavy reliance on bank debt (see table 7.6, “Borrowed Funds”). While 
stock exchanges were established in 1878 in both Tokyo and Osaka, the role 
that the equity and fixed income market were to play in Japan would be highly 
restrictive. It was only for a brief period, between the two world wars, that 
the markets for direct finance provided funds roughly equal in magnitude to 
those generated through internal funds and loans (see Japan Securities Re- 
search Institute 1986). In  1937 all three sources of  funds accounted for ap- 
proximately Y 2 billion. After the Second World War, however, the role of the 
securities market as a supplier of funds would be vastly surpassed by the bank- 
ing sector, despite early attempts of the Occupation powers to dissolve the old 
industrial groupings by selling their shares to the public.6 
The preference for bank financing can be explained in various ways. As far 
as the bond markets were concerned, the fully secured nature of the securities 
and inactive secondary trading made it, in effect, an underdeveloped market 
(see, e.g., Presnell 1975, pp. 427-30).  For the relative unimportance of the 
equity market, Monroe (1973) returns to the par issue method and suggests 
that Japanese investors were focused on dividend yield, while he implicitly 
seems to assume that Japanese firms consider dividend yield the relevant cost 
of equity indicator. With par issue, and a dividend traditionally maintained as 
percentage of the par price, the stock price reduction after the issue in effect 
raises the overall dividend yield. Hodder (1983, in a similar vein, notes that 
the dividend yield on stocks was greater than the cost of bank borrowing, and 
thus reliance on bank debt could be expected. Note that such arguments have 
6. A Securities Coordination Liquidation Committee oversaw the Securities Democratization 
Movement. However, this only concerned a transformation of ownership rather than the raising of 
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Table 7.6  Sources of Funds (% of Funds Raised by Nonfinancial Corporation) 
Internal  External 
Retained  Borrowed 
Earnings  Depreciation  Equity  Bond  Funds  Other 
1961-64  7.9  24.2  12.1  1.9  44.5  9.4 
1965-69  15.3  22.7  5.2  2.0  43.7  11.1 
1970-74  13.3  19.6  4.5  1.6  47.2  13.8 
1975-78  10.7  35.6  4.6  3.6  37.9  7.7 
1979-82  13.4  32.2  4.4  2.1  38.0  10.0 
1983-85  10.8  37.7  4.6  3.3  36.8  6.8 
Source: Tamura (1987), p. 3. 
Noret This table is directly copied from the Fair Fact Series. 
to consider the dividend yield as the relevant cost of  equity measure. And 
indeed,  anecdotal  evidence  suggests  that  Japanese  executives  may  have 
viewed dividends in  such a way.  Still, some doubt can be cast on the “par 
issue-dividend yield’ argument: table 7.7 shows that, even when the system 
changed in the early 1970s from par issue to market issue, there was no appre- 
ciable effect on the  relative funding  importance. Between  1965 and  1969 
equity financing accounted for 10.2% of external funding; between 1970 and 
1974 for only 8.4%. 
While Hodder’s argument would lead  to a straightforward relative price 
story, other reasons for the relatively high leverage ratio’s may  have to be 
considered too. Aoki’s (1984) model shows that it may be in the interest of 
the corporation to “overleverage” if  significant share ownership rests with a 
bank that also supplies borrowed funds to the corporation. Another, simpler 
explanation would be in conformity with Modigliani-Miller; in a system with 
low bankruptcy probability (see below) for the established players, the ex- 
pected costs of financial distress was low-thus  debt financing was preferred 
for  those  with  access  in  the  rationed  system.  In  the  absence of  a  well- 
developed bond market, this meant bank borrowing. 
Still, the reliance of the Japanese major firms on bank financing cannot only 
be a function of relatively favorable bank interest rates due to price controls 
and cartels in the banking sector; no government can regulate the rates down 
for all potential demanders of funds. Instead, the price regulations allowed the 
“preferred” corporations access to the bank loans. Note that such a distribu- 
tion  mechanism itself may explain in  part why Japanese firms built higher 
leverage than most American counterparts (see Table 7.7). Remember that the 
relationship between the Bank of Japan and the city banks was strong. This 
meant that implicitly approval was granted of  the balance sheet structure of 
the banks. In turn, banks may have reasonably expected that the likelihood of 
serious problems with a loan portfolio, which reflected the Bank of Japan’s 
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And indeed, institutional features of the Japanese system helped to “socialize” 
some of  the risks and costs associated with high leverage and financial dis- 
tress. For example,  an “anti-recession cartel law” operated, which reduced 
cash-flow concerns.  Similarly, the strong relationships inside the industrial 
groupings assured assistance to the weakest from the strongest (see, e.g., 
Abegglen and Stalk 1985, pp. 166-67). Finally, the role of the main bank was 
to help in the reorganization of a client during times of financial distress. All 
of  the above facilitated information sharing. Hoshi,  Kashyap, and  Scharf- 
stein’s (1988)  recent empirical investigation of the role of information sharing 
through relationships between established corporations and their banks con- 
firmed  this.  They  showed  that  the  investment  behavior  of  those  firms 
Table 7.7  Leverage of U.S. and Japanese Manufacturing  Industry: Equity as a 
Percentage of Total Liabilities plus Equity 
United States/ 
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with access to the group banks differed indeed from those without such ac- 
cess. 
Applying  models  of  imperfect  information  (and  corporate  incentive 
schemes) the role of  indirect finance attains high significance. The Japanese 
financial system, where, due to severe product market segmentation and price 
regulation,  relationships flourished, seems to have been  able to deal with 
many of the information problems in an effective way.  Here the role of  the 
financial institutions is important and reflects insights such as those offered by 
Bernanke (1983) in the context of the Depression in the United States. 
In this line of reasoning the traditional Japanese financial system was dis- 
tinct in its method of “capital rationing.” The system allowed the authorities 
“guidance maximization,” and those with  access to the funds indeed faced 
“below-market rates.” But the system relied  not only on providing favored 
corporations with access, it also had to ensure that those excluded could not 
mount a credible threat against the system, for example, by accessing well- 
developed, price-driven, public securities markets. 
An emphasis on growth, starting with the Meiji Restoration, and consulta- 
tion between various bureaucracies helped the system to produce outcomes 
that were favorable to all established players. While this is not the place to 
reevaluate the role of organizations like MITI,’ there can be no doubt that in 
cross-national comparison the Japanese policies reflected a production- rather 
than consumption-growth bias.  With rapid growth, the financial system re- 
warded the established players. Those with access in the rationed model ben- 
efited from preferential prices,  the intermediaries were able to attain their 
growth objectives as their client showed an appetite for funds, and the author- 
ities maximized their guidance. The “losers” in this environment were those 
with no established relationships-the  outsiders to the system. However, pre- 
cisely because they had no established relationships they were unable to break 
the system as it produced Japan’s high growth rates. Thus, high leverage be- 
came feasible as long as the system operated with rewards for all who held 
power. 
The high leverage record of the Japanese firms was not only a result of the 
availability of  bank  finance to the preferred players; the high growth rates 
themselves skewed the  financing  structure this way,  due to  an  absence of 
equity financing. In looking at leverage in  Japan,  I  first assume that  sales 
growth is the corporate objective (as will be seen, this is not necessarily incon- 
sistent with standard notions of  shareholder value maximization). Here I do 
not try to show formally why such an objective may have been followed, but 
anecdotal and empirical evidence suggests that sales growth and market share 
played a major role for Japanese firms. Abegglen and Stalk (1985) quote a 
survey study contrasting corporate objectives in Japan and the United States. 
In conformity with popular perception, the number one goal for Japanese cor- 
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porations was Market Share (4.8 on a 1-10  scale of  ranking by  importance) 
with Return on Investment (RoI) following in second place (4.1). For U.S. 
firms, RoI dominated with 8.2 while Market Share followed in distant third 
place with 2.4. 
Given the exposition so far, the emphasis on growth and market share may 
have been fully “rational” in the context of  the system described. With  an 
interaction of national goal development and guidance power by the authori- 
ties and banks, the firms eager to attain the preferential funds had to forge a 
consistency between  their  own goals  and  those  of  the authorities; here  a 
“market-share goal” leading to funds access may be synonymous with (cor- 
porate) wealth maximization. McCraw and O’Brien (1986) present an account 
of  how,  in  the  steel industry during the high growth phase of  the  1960s, 
growth and efficiency achievements were in effect rewarded with license to 
increase capacity. 
If  indeed market share and growth objectives are taken seriously, then high 
leverage  is  a natural  outcome; rapid  sales growth  typically  leads to  asset 
growth. With the equity base of  a company growing at the rate of  retained 
earnings, any sales growth in excess of the growth of the equity base will lead 
to higher leverage. Only with repeated equity issues can the leverage be con- 
tained, an avenue unpopular in Japan, as discussed before. Thus, given a par- 
ticular corporate return on assets and a fixed dividend pay-out ratio, the more 
highly levered firm can grow its sales more rapidly since it has a higher return 
on equity.8  While the financial risk of the typical shareholder increases in this 
scenario, it was already been shown how the Japanese system “socialized’ 
some of these risks. 
In this interpretation the high leverage would be most advantageous for the 
members of  the large industrial groupings with the best growth opportunities 
and the relatively low risk of  financial distress. They would also be the least 
likely firms to find themselves to be capital (borrowing) constrained. Such a 
system would provide many incentives for the various players to “play along.” 
If  indeed the growth would be established, the established players coopted 
into the system would benefit. But here a problem of interpretation arises: for 
the successful high growers, unsuccessful “low” growers had to be found if 
we  assume,  for simplicity,  that  market  size was  exogenously determined. 
While external markets might provide an opportunity to gain market share at 
the cost of  foreign firms, the internal markets would, in effect, only allow for 
zero-sum games. It is, in this light, not surprising that Japanese internal mar- 
ket dynamics were often described as “viciously” competitive. For the overall 
8.  This is a result of the “sustainable  growth” concept, which shows the relationship between 
sales growth (g), Return on Equity (ROE),  and the dividend payout ratio (p):  To  sustain a partic- 
ular capital structure, in the absence of equity issues, sales growth cannot exceed the growth rate 
of the equity base: g = ROE x  (1  -p). Applying the Dupont decomposition of ROE, it follows 
that g = [RoS  X  S/A  X  AIE]  X  (1  -p), where RoS is the return on sales, S/A represents the 
asset intensity of the firm, and AIE (the ratio of  assets to equity) can be thought of as the leverage. 206  David M. Meerschwam 
success of the country though, external growth markets had to be found to 
earn in the international  markets the resources required for the domestic de- 
velopments. 
In this interpretation,  the role of bank finance is essential. It provided the 
authorities the means to influence the distribution of capital along lines con- 
sistent with favored sectors of the economy, while internal competition would 
guarantee efficiency. Here, the role of the internal investment decisions of the 
firms plays a different role, and there is no reason to believe that anything like 
“discounted cash flow” models would be extensively used. And indeed there 
is no evidence that this method of capital budgeting was prevalent in Japan. 
Several authors have looked at the method of investment decisions in Japan. 
Hodder (1985) concludes that, in quantitative analysis, NPV or DCF models 
play at best a very subordinated role. Gultekin and Taga (1987) produce sur- 
vey results from 1986 that show that only  11% of  87 major corporations  in 
Japan consider DCF evaluations,  18% IRR, 20%  ARR, while 41% employ 
pay-back techniques. Hodder (1986) provides an excellent evaluation of in- 
vestment decision-making practices in the United States and Japan. And while 
he concludes that  there  is evidence  that  managers  use the concept of time 
value of money in their decisions, there is no evidence to support the “simple” 
application  of  NPV or DCF models. In  short, not only  is it not clear how 
important  the cost of capital  was as an internationally competitive weapon; 
the whole method of investment decision making should be seen in light of a 
fundamentally different institutional environment. 
This brings back the question of the difference between reliance on direct 
and indirect financing. With direct financing, the performance of the corpora- 
tion is directly judged by arm’s length investors. And while we do not suggest 
that such relationships  always force “short-term”  profit maximization  at the 
cost of  long-term  profits,  Stein (1989) showed in a theoretical model under 
information  asymmetries how  long-term  profit considerations,  especially in 
markets where long-term market-share power may be built, may be compro- 
mised due to a short-term investor horizon. Thus, perhaps somewhat surpris- 
ingly, a perfectly decentralized and disintermediated market for direct finance 
may not generate a first-best outcome; informational and commitment prob- 
lems may be more efficiently solved in an indirect, intermediated,  bank mar- 
ket with strong relationships.  In the international economics literature, papers 
such as Krugman (1988) on “strategic trade policy” essentially refer to similar 
phenomena. 
What this does point to is that the Japanese financial system, by allowing a 
complex form of rationed capital allocation within the context of steering and 
guidance by authorities (without a rigid capital allocation plan), provided the 
beneficiaries of the preferential funds to embark on growth strategies without 
having to rely, to a large extent, on impersonal capital markets. Here the real 
importance seems to rest more in the method of financing (direct vs. indirect) 
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The implication of the above is not to suggest that the cost of capital played 
no role in explaining the success of various Japanese firms in attaining world 
market share. It does, however,  point to three  caveats.  One applies to the 
individual  firm level.  Here I suggest that, for those  with the access to the 
preferential funds, the actual cost of capital advantage seems unambiguously 
low relative  to those inside  Japan without such access. Compared to firms 
outside Japan, taking into account the relatively closed nature of the Japanese 
financial market until the 1970s, many different evaluations can be found, and 
they are discussed in greater detail by Frankel (in this volume). 
The second caveat applies to the importance of the cost of  capital calcula- 
tion. If  many of the prices charged for funds by the intermediaries reflected 
the relationships with the firms, then there is little reason to believe that, given 
the  possibly  different  corporate objectives, the cost of  capital  had  a major 
influence on investment decisions as would be expected from standard models 
such as DCF. Again, the results from Hoshi et al. (1988) provide evidence. 
Third, one should consider the importance of  the  cost of  capital  on the 
overall national  performance of  Japan  (especially  in the cross-national  per- 
spective). As noted, it seems that a rationed capital market was created; here 
there should be no a priori presumption that, even if  standard models of in- 
vestment analysis are used, the economywide cost of capital was low. Instead, 
the argument should revert back to overall saving behavior and the national 
income identity. What could be argued, though, is that if the relationship sys- 
tem was effective in dealing with capital market imperfections  due to infor- 
mation problems in financial transaction (see, e.g., Myers and Majluf  1984), 
then  the  financial  system, rather than  the cost of  capital  per  se, may  have 
contributed to the extraordinary performance of Japan. 
Still, even here the relative  importance of the financial system has to be 
judged compared to the impact of the saving behavior, the proverbial  work 
attitude of the Japanese, the methods of conflict resolution,  the “reverse engi- 
neering  abilities,”  and so on. More important, I show next how the “tradi- 
tional” relationship system in finance is being eroded as internal and external 
pressures force a transition toward a system more reliant on impersonal prices, 
thus making the Japanese system less distinct. 
7.3  From Relationships to lkansactions 
The relationship system described above functioned well. It assisted Japan 
in rapid rebuilding, high growth, low inflation, and low unemployment-the 
country seemed to have been doing everything right. Yet change was to come 
to the system. Many observers have, during the 1980s, described the “liber- 
alization” of the Japanese financial markets, but I suggest that the impetus for 
change occurred much earlier: it was in the wake of the oil shock that many of 
the  carefully designed dependencies of  the system  started to break  down. 
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system, further change occurred (see, e.g., Frankel 1984), in a system that 
had already started to let prices play a more active role due to domestic pres- 
sures. 
It was Japan’s response to the oil shock of  1974 that changed the financial 
system. With a dramatic reversal of the growth rates from almost 10% in 1973 
to -  1% in 1974, the Japanese authorities embarked on a Keynesian counter- 
cyclical expansion; they allowed for a large budget deficit to be generated. At 
the same time that domestic growth collapsed and a major international reces- 
sion occurred, Japan’s corporations saw their fund needs evaporate. With high 
depreciation charges and low investment appetite, cash flows burgeoned and 
the loan dependency was reduced (see table 7.6). This meant a basic reversal 
in the national flow of funds; the government became the net large absorber of 
funds, replacing the corporate sector (see table 7.8). 
Table 7.8  Government Financing Need 
~~ 
Japan’s Central Government’s General Account (100 million Yen) 
Government 
Revenue  Borrowing  B as % of  A 
Government  Securities and 

































































































Source: Economic Staristics Annual, 1988, Research and Statistics Department, Bank of Japan, 
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Table 7.9  Bank Profitabilitya 
~~  ~~  ~ 
Compound Growth Rates of Bank Profits and Assets 
Assets  Profits 
(%)  (%) 
1960-65  19.7  9.0 
1965-70  14.8  23.5 
1970-75  17.4  3.4 
1975-80  9.7  3.8 
1980-85  9.5  13.0 
1985-87  12.3  24.9 
Source: Economic Statistics Annual, 1988, Research and Statistics Department,  Bank of Japan, 
Note: Profits are reported on first half-last  half basis until 1980; after 1980, fiscal years are used. 
’Banks included are city banks and regional banks. 
p. 104. 
For the financial intermediaries,  the world changed almost overnight. Now 
they had to absorb ever-larger public securities issues while the normally prof- 
itable lending opportunities to corporations shrank. The government, unwill- 
ing to allow for a competitive tender, instead focused on keeping its financing 
costs low.  As a result,  the (forced) bond subscription became a serious con- 
cern for the banks (see tables 7.9 and 7.10). Profitability at the city banks, the 
central  players  in  this game, was compromised  at the time that the  power 
relationship between them and the authorities had changed-now  the author- 
ities had to ask for funding and no longer the overloaned banks. 
The outcome of the changed relationship was that the banks asked for, and 
attained, new interest rate freedoms (see, e.g., Feldman 1986, pp. 50-56  and 
Bronte 1982, p. 21). At first only few interest rates of particular products were 
affected, but an unmistakable step was taken away from the strictly controlled 
price system. Similarly, new freedoms were granted in an incipient secondary 
market where the institutions could “unload’ some of their holdings,  as the 
Bank of Japan was no longer willing to repurchase the issue. 
A second set of events furthered the transition toward more price-oriented 
financial transactions.  With the breakdown of the international financial sys- 
tem after the Smithsonian agreement, new exchange-rate freedoms were ob- 
served. And while the Japanese financial authorities continued to try to isdate 
their domestic markets from foreign pressures, balance of payments pressures 
allowed for “leakages” to develop in this sector of the market as well, first in 
response  to the current account deficit  related  to the oil shock,  later in re- 
sponse to the current account surplus.  For example, in  1975 Matsushita be- 
came the  first  Japanese  corporation  allowed  to issue  a  dollar-denominated 
convertible debenture; in 1977 Euro-yen bonds were allowed (albeit only for 
nonresident  issuers).  Add to this that  in the  1980s Japan’s current  account 
surplus  started  to show an embarrassment of riches with concomitant pres- 210  David M. Meerschwam 
Table 7.10  Government Bond Holdings by City Banks and All Banks as % of 
Total Assets 























































Source: Economic Statistics Annual, 1988, Research and Statistics Department, Bank of Japan, 
pp. 44-52. 
sures for further liberalization,  and the host of events that took place between 
1977 and  1989 can only be  seen as steps in a transition away from a rela- 
tionship system toward a system that is increasingly driven by price transac- 
tions. 
The increased reliance and popularity of the price-driven  instruments has 
another  reason  as well.  In  financial  transactions,  “learning” by  the  market 
participants  takes place.  In this context the changes in the corporate finance 
structure of many U.S. firms, which have “discovered”  the highly leveraged 
buy-out  and  merger  transactions,  are nothing  but  the  acceptance  of  a new 
orthodoxy, or, as some skeptics may argue, nothing but the actions of newer 
participants  who have  forgotten  some of the  lessons of financial  prudence, 
driven home to many older participants by memories of the 1930s. Such learn- 
ing in Japan  is seen in the eager experimentation  with many  of  the  highly 
price-sensitive products developed in foreign markets,  where Japanese indi- 
viduals and firms increasingly place their capital account deficit. The devel- 
opment of interest rate swaps and stock index futures are but two examples. 
The impact of these changes can be profound.  Take, for example, the new 
interest rate swap. Before, specialized financial institutions divided the finan- 
cial product market by maturity of finance. In particular, only long-term credit 
banks could issue long-term debentures, while city banks could only fund on 
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much  maturity transformation-the  introduction of  a swap market  in effect 
renders such funding segmentation obsolete.  Similarly, the introduction of a 
CD market with true interest freedoms has changed the funding behavior of 
the banks,  while the introduction  of a CP market has allowed  corporations 
new funding opportunities and new investment outlets. 
The changes that have occurred on the banking side of the financial system 
can only be interpreted as a move toward greater reliance on the price mecha- 
nism, a mitigation of the specialized financing functions of the various insti- 
tutions,  and a move toward greater convergence  with  the financial  systems 
operative in other major financial centers, such as the United States and the 
United Kingdom. But the movement toward a less distinctive system was not 
only seen in bank finance. Change occurred in securities transactions as well. 
While rights issues were popular in Japan, it was from the early 1970s that 
increasingly issues at market were to take place. After the first such market- 
priced issue had taken place in 1969 for a musical instrument maker, Nihon 
Gakki, this method of raising funds became more fashionable over time, and 
while the oil-shock’s impact on funds needs slowed the growth of such market 
issues for some time, they would eventually come to dominate. In issuing at 
market, rather than at par, Japanese firms faced an interesting effect on their 
dividend policies. Typically, dividends had been set as a percentage of the par 
price of the shares; with the new issues at market, the corporations at first kept 
their dividend policies unchanged, thus vastly reducing the effective dividend 
pay-out ratio. A self-regulatory order of the securities industries changed this 
practice, and through a rule of “the Distribution of Profits” in effect set mini- 
mum dividend pay-out ratios. 
The bond market also showed change. Traditionally, only fully secured de- 
bentures could be issued, since in 1905 a Secured Bond Trust Law had been 
enacted. The fully secured bonds did not only, in effect, enhance the relation- 
ship between the issuer and investor-traditionally,  to a large extent, financial 
institutions-but  such full collateralization  also  excluded  many  nonestab- 
lished players  from the market.  An example can be found in the financing 
moves  of  a company like Ito-Yokado,  a nontraditional  firm,  started  in the 
wake of the Second World War to become Japan’s second largest supermarket 
chain. Without traditional relationships it was capital constrained in an indus- 
try that was, in Japan, capital intensive. With few assets (such as properties) 
that could be subsequently used as collateral for bond issues, Ito Yokado was 
constrained by the full collateral requirement and had to explore new ways of 
financing its operations.  The company became one of  the financial entrepre- 
neurs eagerly embracing (and often trying to further) financial innovation that 
reduced  the  dominance of  relationships  from which  they  were  excluded. 
Thus, It0 Yokado used, for example, innovative lease financing to attain as- 
set use. 
Other innovations in the bond markets took place as well. In 1979, a sub- 
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debenture. A year later Matsushita  Electronics  was the second company  to 
use the debenture format. While at first very rigid standards were employed 
in granting permission to issue such unsecured bonds, standards were relaxed, 
actually following the looser standards that had been approved for the earlier 
Euroyen unsecured bonds.  Similarly, issuing standards for convertible bonds 
were relaxed as well. It can be hardly a surprise that, in this new environment, 
rating agencies have appeared that resemble their Western counterparts. 
In the money market, change has equally been observed. Call money inter- 
est rates have been liberalized,  RePos have found more price flexibility, the 
introduction of a CP market was noted,  and the price sensitivity of  CDs en- 
larged. In short, it is much more difficult than before to highlight the distinc- 
tive nature of the Japanese financial markets. This does not mean to suggest 
that the Japanese  market  is identical  in structure  to the  market of, say, the 
United States. What is observed, though, is that the market is relying more on 
prices in distributing funds than it did before, while at the same time the inter- 
actions with foreign markets  have increased as foreign financial institutions 
have  entered the  Tokyo market  looking  for opportunities  to introduce  new 
techniques and products and as Japanese financial firms have entered foreign 
markets. 
7.4  The Impact of Change 
While it is impossible to present a complete list of the changes that have 
taken place in the Japanese financial system, especially as much change is still 
ongoing, the impact of the changes can be speculated upon. I suggested,  in 
the description  of the high growth phase of the Japanese economy,  that the 
overall system design seemed to have fit very well with an industrial targeting 
policy, and that a combination of reliance on indirect finance, relative isola- 
tion from the securities market as far as corporate control is concerned, and 
close cooperation  between  the  banks,  authorities,  and  corporations  helped 
along a remarkable performance. 
In this interpretation,  finance did provide Japan with a competitive advan- 
tage in its quest for world market share, but through a complex system rather 
than through simply keeping the cost of capital low. In the emerging environ- 
ment  other questions have  to be raised, if  indeed a move  toward  a price- 
competitive  system in the allocation of capital is taking place.  As the tradi- 
tional  “rationed-bank-finance”  system  is  superceded,  new  techniques  for 
investment decisions, capital allocation, and capital funding have to be found. 
Such new techniques  have to be developed at times when  new pressures 
face the various corporations.  For example, the impact of the newly estab- 
lished rating agencies has to be considered.  Will they start to apply leverage 
targets in rating the publicly issued securities, and, if so, will the traditionally 
higher leverage of Japanese firms start to show costs associated with the at- 
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considerations should play a more important role, as it opens the markets for 
new, nontraditional borrowers. 
But there are other considerations that should be taken into account as well. 
The financial  system changed at a time when,  and in this interpretation be- 
cause, the high growth phase of the economic development of Japan came to 
a screeching halt. The success of the system had been in large measure defined 
as (as well as relied on) creating the high growth rates, this allowed all estab- 
lished players the rewards needed to assure their conformity with the system, 
while  it facilitated  the exclusion of the “outsiders.”  As the growth stopped, 
the  financial  structure  of  the  corporations  would  change.  Now,  less  asset 
growth had to be financed while retained earnings would augment the equity 
component of  the capital structure. With more reliance on retained earnings, 
leverage was to come down, an outcome consistent  with  the lower growth 
opportunities from a risk perspective. Furthermore, as I already pointed out, 
the  advantages of leverage are great when high growth strategies are being 
pursued.  Note that, in traditional corporate finance, given a particular return 
on assets  (RoA), the higher  ROE associated  with  higher leverage does not 
necessarily translate to higher shareholder value, since the required return on 
capital (or the cost of equity capital) would typically rise with higher financial 
risk at the corporate level.9 Depending on one’s beliefs about the efficiency of 
the markets and the “value” of tax shields, in effect the debate is simply about 
the optimal capital structure. Assuming, for simplicity, no changes in the re- 
lationship between  the market  and book  value of a corporation,  the higher 
return  requirement  on equity, as leverage increases,  can equally be  seen in 
lower P/E ratios. 
While many caveats should be made in considering Japanese P/E ratios- 
many investigations have stumbled on complex accounting issues and the val- 
ues of  “hidden assets”-in  the low growth phase of the economy P/Es have 
indeed decreased, even though the surge in the stock market since 1984 has 
shown, for more recent periods, high ratios. At the time that these P/E ratios 
declined (1976-84),  leverage declined as well. 
Within a traditional corporate finance evaluation such a P/E decline is un- 
usual; with lower financial risk the P/E ratio would normally be expected to 
rise. However, given the interpretation provided so far, the lower leverage of 
the  Japanese corporations  (between  1974 and  1984) cannot necessarily  be 
identified  with  lower  financial  risk-the  overall  financial  system  changed 
away from the strongest relationships.  Since these relationships provided im- 
plicit guarantees, the changes that have occurred may have, in effect, caused 
the financial risks of the corporations to increase despite their attempts to un- 
lever. Of course, this argument cannot explain the remarkable increase in P/E 
ratios that has taken place since the early  1980s and is discussed by Frankel 
(in this volume). 
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In short, it seems that it was not only the financial system that lost some of 
its  distinctiveness,  but  the  financial  structure  observed  in  the  corporations 
moved away from the characteristic very high leverage to lower ratios. Com- 
pletely  in conformity with this trend,  the reliance on indirect financing de- 
clined,  while  direct  financing  became  a  more  important  source  of  funds. 
While between  1970 and  1974 corporations raised 33% of their funds inter- 
nally (1  3% through retained earning and 20% through depreciation charges), 
borrowings accounted for 47%, with the equity market supplying 5% and the 
fixed income market 2%  of all required funds. Between  1983 and 1985, this 
picture changed. Now 49% was raised through internal funds (1  1  % through 
retained  earnings  and  38%  through  depreciation  charges)  and  only  37% 
through  borrowings,  with  the  equity market  still  only  supplying  4.6%  of 
funds, but the bond market now accountable for 3.3% (see table 7.6). 
Concentrating on nonfinancial corporations listed on the first section of the 
Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE), the numbers are even more dramatic, as inter- 
nal  funds doubled  to supply 71% of funds needs,  up from 35% during the 
period  1970-74.  Borrowings, on the other hand declined from 41% between 
1970-74  to 6% for  1983-85.  Note  that this  “magnification” effect for the 
listed companies on the TSE should be no surprise; the larger, well established 
corporations had been the primary beneficiaries of the relationship system. 
It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that, as the financial system changed, 
the corporations’  financing techniques  also seem to have lost some of their 
unique characteristics.  Of course, a question of causality may be raised; did 
the system change because the corporations had become unhappy with their 
capital structure or did the change in the system force corporations to change 
their capital raising procedures and their financial structure? Here the interpre- 
tation is that neither of the two suggestions is correct but that instead the two 
should be seen as outcomes of the same driving forces for change. Thus I do 
not  suggest that the financial structure  during the traditional phase was the 
result of the particular financial environment;  the two interacted in complex 
ways with each other, one reinforcing the other. 
Take, for example, the city banks.  Without the rapid growth of the estab- 
lished firms, their loan demand would have been less. Without the loan de- 
mand, the banks would not have been required to be marginally funded by the 
Bank of Japan. Without the last dependence, the method of “window guid- 
ance” would have been less effective. At the same time, without the loan de- 
mand, the financial institutions would have found it more difficult to accept 
the forced-subscription  method  for the public government  issues, which  in 
turn would have forced more interest-rate freedoms. Many similar dependen- 
cies could be found. 
If the above is correct, it is remarkable to note that, as Japan moved away 
from the traditional system, its overall performance has remained exceptional. 
Current account accumulation replaced high growth as the new enviable trait 
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system on Japan’s performance cannot be correct for the traditional phase if, 
during the emergence of the new system, an equally successful performance 
is observed. On the one hand it should be emphasized that the changes toward 
a system more reliant on the price mechanism has not totally abrogated the 
old relationship system. On the other hand, a speculation may be made about 
the role the system is currently playing in achieving a different kind of success 
from what has been observed before. 
As the primary role of the system was to ensure a particular allocation of 
capital during the traditional phase, in the newly emerging system more stan- 
dard forms of competition for capital within Japan have occurred. Here rela- 
tionships and a position of acceptance play less of a role. At the same time it 
is now the overall national saving behavior that reflects the most distinguish- 
ing feature of the Japanese economy. To  put it differently: with high national 
savings and trading partners such as the United States, with negative national 
savings, the performance of the Japanese economy fits very simply within any 
standard, open macroeconomic framework. In contrast, during the traditional 
phase,  growth was  stimulated through a guided rationing system that  may 
have been able to deal with certain information problems effectively. 
This is the reason to suggest that careful measures of the cost of capital may 
provide, at best, marginal insights for the developments during that period. 
If, however, a financial system is currently observed that conforms more to 
standard notions and if, at the same time, the Japanese corporations face more 
standard financial trade-offs and are perhaps more driven to apply choice mod- 
els in investment decisions that explicitly recognize a price-competitive capi- 
tal market, then it is more likely that, in international competition, business 
decisions may today indeed be differentially affected for Japanese versus U. S. 
corporations, by cost of capital considerations. 
Take, again, the impact of rating agencies on Japanese bond issuers. They 
will enforce, through their rating standards, new methods of firm evaluation. 
Similarly, with many corporations’ equity investments currently residing in 
the so-called Tokkin funds, different pressures for stock performance can be 
expected. If, allowing for these developments, more traditional U.S.  corpo- 
rate  objectives will be  assimilated into Japanese business practice,  models 
such as DCF analysis are bound to play a larger role. Again, I do not suggest 
that the Japanese corporate decision-making process will be identical to the 
one in the United States, but the direction of change will be such that a less 
rather than a more distinct structure will be seen. 
7.5  The Cost of Capital 
Since another contribution (Frankel, in this volume) deals explicitly with 
the cost of capital issues, I will only present the highlights of the controversy 
in relation to what has been argued before. With evidence being almost con- 
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of  capital  advantage for Japanese  firms has proven  to be a growth industry. 
Contributions such as Hatsopoulos (l983), Hatsopoulos, Krugman and Sum- 
mers (1988), Baldwin (1986), Ando and Auerbach (1985) and (l987), Friend 
and Tokutsu (1987), Hodder (1988) and Luehrman and Kester (1988) have all 
looked at (aspects of) the cost of capital to explain differences  in corporate 
performance between the United States and Japan. Not surprisingly, given the 
vastly  different  institutional  environments in  the  two countries, the  papers 
either  had to try to account for specific national  conventions  (e.g.,  hidden 
reserves,  pension  fund liabilities,  etc.) or to ignore them. A third avenue of 
pursuit rested on looking at a “stripped down” version of the controversy- 
ignoring the cost of capital for firms, but instead looking at one determining 
factor, such as the risk-free interest rate. 
The ultimate purpose of these investigations, in contrast to macroeconomic 
explorations into the national saving behavior,  was to explain corporate per- 
formance and investment  decisions, and, mostly  implicitly,  the  significant 
gain of world market share by Japanese firms, often at the cost of U.S. firms. 
Still, the investigation into possible different WACCs for Japan and the United 
States, has shown contradictory  results after increasingly careful estimation, 
even for the same authors (cf. Ando and Auerbach  1985 and Ando and Auer- 
bach  1987). But even recent studies are able to generate very different conclu- 
sions. Baldwin (1986) concludes that the cost of capital differences on a risk- 
adjusted basis are minor, while Ando and Auerbach (1987), in contrast, find 
significant cost advantages for Japanese firms. Hodder (1988) provides a syn- 
thesis between the two results, relying heavily on information problems and 
monitoring costs. 
Attempting  to  avoid  the  company  specific  problems  in  measuring  the 
WACC,  Luehrman  and  Kester  (1989)  focus  instead  on  a  central  input 
of the WACC and concentrate on a real risk-free return comparison between 
the United States and Japan. They find that real returns are not equalized be- 
tween the two countries, but that the deviations do not systematically favor 
Japan.  Such  differences  in  the  real  returns  are  consistent  with  findings 
by  authors such as Frankel and Froot (1987) if one considers long-run,  sus- 
tained  deviations  from purchasing  power.  The latter finding, however,  sug- 
gests that the yen-dollar relationship has been characterized by a long-term ap- 
preciation  of  the  yen, thus  leading  to suggest that  the  real  return, even  in 
the absence of barriers to capital mobility, should have remained favorable to 
Japan. 
Since I argue that the institutional framework has been central in consider- 
ing corporate finance in Japan, rather than  a simple measure of the cost of 
capital (such as the WACC), it is more important to consider the cost of capital 
controversy with an eye toward the future. Two important trends have to be 
acknowledged;  one is that  the relationship  system  in Japan is receding-it 
may mean that many of the information-related problems, so effectively dealt 
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that increasingly  international  capital market integration is taking place and 
that thus the access of corporations  from one country  to another  country’s 
capital market is facilitated. lo 
However, even if one were to assume that the cost of  capital was identical 
to Japanese and U.S. firms, that companies in both countries employed iden- 
tical investment-decision models, that tax structures were similar, and that for 
all  companies the  same pressures  from  shareholders  and  debt  holders  ob- 
tained,  it is clear that the U.S. “competitiveness” problem could still not be 
solved through the corporate cost of capital “equalization.” Instead, the under- 
lying reasons for the loss of U.S. world market share has to be acknowledged 
as a lack of national savings in the United States. 
While some, such as Scott (1984), have argued about a possible loss of 
U.S. “competitiveness” early on, it is only more recently that the concept has 
captured popular attention. Clearly the large current account imbalances have 
aided in the recognition of the problem.  Still, these very current account im- 
balances indicate that the cause of the problem cannot lie in the cost of capital 
difference; it has to rely on a national savings argument. 
Thus, much of the debate about the cost of capital may be about the internal 
distribution of growth of corporations within the confines of the national sav- 
ings behavior.  In this respect, it is not surprising that a group of prominent 
U.S. economists asked their colleagues recently  to petition for a sales tax to 
generate national savings; in contrast to individual executives who may con- 
centrate on their cost of capital, for this group of professional economists it is 
the aggregate performance  of  U.S.  industry that stands central. Similarly, it 
should be clear that, for Japan, a requirement of national dissaving becomes 
imperative, given its large (and sustained) current account surplus. To  achieve 
such adjustments in the national saving rates will require policy initiative, as 
it seems clear that during the last half-decade automatic adjustment has been 
elusive at best.  In particular, emphasis can be put on the U.S.  government’s 
saving behavior as a major influence on the national saving rate as shown by 
Summers and Carroll (1987). 
7.6  Conclusions 
This paper argues that both the financial system and the cost of capital mat- 
ter in explaining the relatively extraordinary  performance  of Japan-not  as 
the sole determinants but as important inputs. It is shown that Japan’s distinct 
national financial system displayed characteristics that were established in a 
relatively  short period  of  time  after the Meiji Restoration  (1868) and  fully 
developed in a period of two decades (1954-74).  The central feature of the 
10. While international capital mobility may have increased, several authors have shown that 
due to  a failure of purchasing power parity in the short term, this does not mean that real interest 
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“relationship”  system was  that  it  allowed  for  guided  capital  rationing.  It 
achieved this outcome through financial product market segmentation,  price 
regulation,  and hierarchical organization.  Within the context of standard eco- 
nomic models, the system was organized in such a way as to deal effectively 
with many problems currently  associated with terms such as asymmetric in- 
formation, agency problems, and incentive compatibility. 
A complex, rich, institutionally varied system undoubtedly helped Japan to 
focus on its growth strategy, reflecting a national consensus of objective and 
an inability of those excluded from access to preferential capital to seriously 
challenge the system. In Japan, indirect finance came to dominate and allowed 
for capital structures significantly different  from what  was observed  in  the 
United States. At the same time, there seems to have been built into the sys- 
tem an ability for corporations to avoid earnings performance pressure; access 
to financial capital was not the result of profit targets but instead was vested in 
the relationships with the suppliers of finance. Obviously investment decision 
making did not conform with simple models that stress share-price maximi- 
zation through  discounted  cash flow.  In this sense it is misguided to expect 
indicators such as the weighted average cost of capital to shed significant light 
on the relative performance of Japanese firms as compared to their U.S.  coun- 
terparts. 
It  was  argued  that  the  Japanese  financial  system  underwent  significant 
change during the 1970s. Not, as is commonly suggested because of external 
pressures  to liberalize  the  financial  service  sector,  but  simply  because  the 
aftermath of  the oil shock broke some of the dependencies and carefully cre- 
ated balances  that had allowed the Japanese relationship to flourish. Again, 
the importance of institutional factors is enormous. With a less important re- 
lationship  system, the Japanese financial market  started to more closely re- 
semble that of  the United States. With new institutional factors, such as a less 
heavy reliance on bank financing, which had incorporated many information- 
sharing advantages, and new corporate organization forms (such as the Tokkin 
funds), new pressures  may come to bear on the Japanese firm. Not surpris- 
ingly, rating agencies have now surfaced in Japan. In this new environment, 
shareholder pressures may grow, and one may speculate that more traditional 
models such as DCF may gain in currency-now,  cost of capital differences 
may start to play a more transparent role, but they will have to be related  to 
either institutional differences that allow for differences in capital structure or 
to failures of international capital mobility. 
As a result  it may be surprising  that Japan has been  able to continue  to 
perform enviably, even though it is now the international asset accumulation 
rather than the growth performance that commands the center of attention. 
Here, 1 argue, it is most useful to revert back to the basic national income 
identity: it is the national saving behavior of the Japanese economy rather than 
individual corporations cost of capital advantages that deserve attention. 219  The Japanese Financial System and the Cost of  Capital 
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Comment  Koichi Hamada 
Meerschwam  discusses  various  historical,  institutional,  and  policy-related 
factors that could have affected the cost of capital in Japan or that could have 
made the concept of  the cost of  capital itself less relevant in Japan than in 
Western countries. The topics covered are rather extensive so that the paper 
serves as a good introduction to this issue as well as an  informative back- 
ground paper on the quantitative study of the cost of capital by  Frankel. The 
attempt to relate the issue to the incentive mechanism under asymmetric infor- 
mation is a very useful one. As an economist, I wish this paper were written 
in such a way as to enable the reader to see transparently what kind of theoret- 
ical model is behind various arguments contained in it. In any case, this paper 
let me reconsider several institutional features of the Japanese financial mar- 
ket.  I will discuss some of  these issues that came to my  mind while I was 
reading this extensive work. 
As the author argues, the Japanese financial system was a highly regulated 
system during.the 1950s and 1960s. Already in the 1960s, the market mecha- 
nism became quite dominant.  The author emphasizes the year  1974 as the 
turning point that marks the period  when  the high growth of  the Japanese 
economy  was  halted  and  the  resulting  accumulation of  government debt 
changed the structure of  the flow  of funds. The process of  deregulation or 
liberalization had already started, however, during the late 1960s. One factor 
to which the author does not pay sufficient attention is the ceiling of nominal 
interest rate, like the Regulation Q in the United States. Large depositors were 
given implicit interest by various side payments; for example, the gift of fur- 
niture or tickets to an excursion trip. But the small depositors could only get 
such trifles as tissue paper, and even the amount of that was once limited by 
coalition talks among banks. This low cost of supply of funds to commercial 
banks must have been a factor to reduce the cost of capital to the insiders that 
had access to commercial lending from large keiretsu banks. Also, the exis- 
tence of the very high interest rate (often more than 100 percent per annum) 
indicates that the outsiders had to be satisfied with the very high cost of capi- 
tal. Certainly, the existence of a segmented financial market was a factor that 
makes the calculation, as well as the interpretation, of the cost of capital dif- 
ficult. I cannot agree with the author to the extent that the discounted cash 
flow or the cost of capital was irrelevant, but I agree in that we should at least 
get an explicit account of the segmentation of the market. 
It makes sense to argue that the traditional segmented system gave an ad- 
vantage to insiders in  terms of  incentives to invest. Face-to-face customer 
relationships might have been a better way to cope with asymmetric informa- 
tion than the impersonal, standardized channel of  funds through marketable 
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securities. The questions remain, however.  Why did this  system develop in 
Japan and not, for example, in the United  States? And  why  has it been  re- 
placed by  the market  system in the present Japan? The entry barrier to the 
insiders should have  been very high. Then, these collusive activities might 
have been quite expensive from the standpoint of  depositors and small cus- 
tomers of commercial banks. 
Finally, let me discuss the author’s concluding remark that not the cost of 
capital but the amount of savings is the crucial problem to understanding the 
relative decline of productivity growth in the United States. First of all, as the 
author admits in the introduction,  such factors as labor productivity and qual- 
ity control are important as well. Second, I do not think that the amount of 
savings and the cost of capital are alternative concepts. The cost of capital can 
be measured by the abscissa of the intersection of  the demand and the supply 
curve of funds. If the supply curve shifts to the right, then the realized price 
of the funds will tend to be lower.  If the world capital market is fully inte- 
grated, the  cost of  capital  among countries  will  be equated  by  the  flow of 
funds from high-saving  countries  to low-saving ones. If there exist impedi- 
ments to international capital flows, as Feldstein and Horioka argue, then the 
high-saving countries will normally enjoy the lower cost of capital unless in- 
vestment opportunities among countries are drastically different. 
Comment  Robert Alan Feldman 
David Meerschwam’s paper contributes to our knowledge of  Japanese finan- 
cial markets by emphasizing two major themes, the role of the financial sys- 
tem as a risk bearer and the importance of the insider-outsider phenomenon. 
Rather than nitpick at arguments in the paper, I would like to offer some re- 
flections that it stimulated. 
The Financial System as Risk Sharer 
The financial industry  exists to transform  assets, to disburse risk,  and to 
provide a menu of combinations of return and insurance.  In examining the 
evolution of a financial system, it is important to ask what types of asset trans- 
formation were carried out, whom  this transformation  benefited,  how risks 
were disbursed, what combinations of return and risk were provided, and who 
were the providers and beneficiaries of the implicit or explicit insurance. The 
precise mix of risks faced by both firms and intermediaries is a critical deter- 
minant of  financial structure. The types of contracts and risk-sharing formulas 
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that are optimal for any system naturally reflect this structure of risks, which 
may change over time. 
The high growth period in Japan was one of  relatively great risks external 
to firms, the variability of growth being the key risk. However, international 
conditions, for example, external demand and oil and commodity prices, were 
stable. Risks internal to the firm were also mixed. The high educational level 
of the work force relative to the stage of development meant that labor short- 
ages could be overcome; the ability to follow practices in other countries and 
improve on them was a source of growth without excessive R&D burdens. 
But management mistakes were inevitable in an economy changing so rapidly. 
For banks, credit risk was high but system risk low, especially with govern- 
ment policy playing so large a role in ensuring the safety of  intermediaries. 
With the end of the high-growth period, however, the mix if risk character- 
istics changed for both firms and intermediaries.  The variability of the cycle 
has been much lower. But international conditions have been far more vari- 
able, with major oil shocks in both directions, exchange rate fluctuations, and 
changing growth patterns in the rest of the world. For banks, credit risk re- 
mains important, but the greater integration of world financial markets  has 
increased system risk substantially.  And event risk has raised the correlation 
of returns on assets held by intermediaries. 
In light of this new mix of risks, it seems inevitable that the Japanese finan- 
cial system would change its mode of operation. An economy with good long- 
term prospects  but high short-term variability  naturally lends itself  to long- 
term  banking relationships  that  preserve  access  to credit  in  lower  growth 
periods in return for the banks’ implicitly taking a piece of the action through 
equity positions. But with less variability and more worry about longer-term 
performance, it seems logical for firms to stop paying insurance premia for 
credit access in downswings and for banks to shift to shorter-term horizons in 
asset choice. Greater event risk would also tend to weaken long-term relation- 
ships, since, because of  its  international  nature,  the  losers and the gainers 
from shocks cannot be brought into the same insurance pool. 
The Insider-Outsider Problem 
Many  of  the  papers  at  this  conference,  including  Meerschwam’s,  have 
touched on  the insider-outsider  problem. Even for Japanese firms, it can be 
difficult to penetrate established long-term relationships, and so it is important 
to understand the nature of such relationships.  I think that The Evolution of 
Cooperation,  by  Robert  Axelrod,  has  much  to  contribute  to  this  under- 
standing. ’ 
Axelrod asserts that life is not a bowl of cherries but rather an iterated pris- 
oner’s dilemma game of unknown length. He then shows that, under reason- 
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able payoff matricies, the optimal strategy is tit for tat, that is, to cooperate on 
the first move and then respond as your opponent acted on the previous move. 
He also shows that a colony of “tit for tat-ers” can, if sufficiently large, invade 
a  world  of  mean-strategy  opponents  and  not  only  prosper  but  grow.  This 
model may hold the key to understanding insider-outsider (i.e., keiretsu) be- 
havior in Japan. Even though members of a cooperating group tend to have 
lower average scores than some clever but mean opponents, they still thrive in 
the long run. This result suggests that one way for foreigners to crack the 
Japanese market is to become members of the insider groups. Such member- 
ship is particularly important in an age when information exchange is a key 
element in value creation. 